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Abstract
The LHC will require a post-mortem data recording
system for faults in the commissioning and preparations
without beam, as well as for operation with beam. What
data should be recorded in order to understand faults?
What are the requirements for synchronization? How
should Post Mortem and Logging Data be used in the
Control Room?
1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The stored energies in the LHC beams and magnet
systems will inevitably lead to a reduction of operational
efficiency because of the need to protect components by
dumping beams or extracting the magnetic stored energy
from the cryostat. Diagnosis of these incidents, their
causes and consequences will improve the availability of
production beams by:
x providing a rapid explanation of the best procedure
to initiate appropriate action and restore beams,
x building a longer term knowledge of accelerator
operation which will lead to better operational
procedures, and
x enhancing the performance of the machine protection
system which will allow operators to increase the
beam intensity.
Moreover, it is essential to monitor the correct
functioning of the various protection elements which
include quench detection, machine protection and the
beam dumping systems. In the unlikely event of damage
to components an explanation of the incident will be of
prime importance.
A facility for the collection, analysis and management
of relevant information must be complete and coherent
across all systems to achieve these aims. Such a system
may be referred to as a ‘Post Mortem Facility’.
As well as diagnostics for Beam Abort and Power
Abort incidents, the Post Mortem Facilities should also be
prepared for more general usage. Applications will
include diagnosis of significant beam losses, collection of
data during machine development and investigation of
‘mysterious’ problems.
2 ALARM, LOGGING AND TRANSIENT
DATA
There has been an increase in the data that is regularly
logged from SL accelerators. Starting from machine
settings, and data to report and to improve overall
operational efficiency, logging has been extended to
applications such as energy calibration and equipment
management. The CERN Alarm System also archives all
fault states; the information provides diagnostics for
severe events such as the fire in the SPS BA3 building.
Modern industrial supervisors invariably include logging
and trending capabilities. Future developments will also
be generated by INB regulations.
From these observations it is clear that:
x the Post Mortem Facility must be designed with close
attention to the complementary logging and alarm
systems;
x Post Mortem analysis will be performed at the
accelerator level and the equipment level. In this
paper the emphasis is given to data required for
accelerator level diagnostics.
Without being exhaustive the following definitions
may be applied.
Alarms are fixed format messages that are generated
asynchronously upon the occurrence of some unwanted
incident which is considered to be a fault by the message
recipient.
Logging is the systematic collection of information
either synchronously or when some input value changes
by some predefined quantity referred to as a deadband or
epsilon.
Fast Transient data is collected from a wide variety of
sources when a predefined incident occurs. It is typically
data originating from fast acquisition into circular buffers.
The incident generates a Post Mortem Trigger which
freezes the acquisitions. Buffering ensures pre- and post-
trigger data.
3 WHAT DATA IS NEEDED?
An overview of data requirements for Post Mortem at
the accelerator level is given in the Table. Systems have
been classed into four types. Services are the technical
systems which are essential for accelerator operation
although they can be operated with essentially no
feedback concerning beam processes in the accelerator.
Post Mortem information is mainly supplied by specific
logging facilities. Protection systems group elements that
must work properly in order to trigger and execute Beam
Aborts and Power Aborts. These systems include the
proper functioning of Post Mortem facilities as a critical
objective and, for this reason, they are characterized by
being self-triggering. The third system encompasses all
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Access System n y y n n Sector
Cooling and Ventilation n y y n n Sector Services
Cryogenics n y y n n Sector
Electrical Network y n y ? n Sector
Beam Dump y n y ? y Beam
Beam Loss Monitors y y y y y Sector
Energy Extraction Switches y y y ? y Sector Protection
Machine Protection ? y y n y Sector
Quench Protection y y y ? y Sector
Aperture Kickers y n y y n Beam
Beam Feedback Systems y ? y y n Beam
Collimators ? y y ? n Sector
Inflector y n y y n Sector
Power Converters y y y y n Sector Act on Beam
RF Power & Low-Level y y y y n Beam
Reference Magnet Signals y y y y n Sector
Transverse Dampers y n y y n Beam
Vacuum n y y n n Sector
Beam Current Monitors y y y y n Beam
Beam Position Monitors y y y y n Sector Monitors
Beam Profile Monitors y y y y n Beam
Cryostat Instrumentation ? y y ? n Sector
Summary of PCR Post Mortem Data Requirements
equipment that can directly induce a beam loss. Data
acquisition is typically triggered by the Post Mortem
Trigger. Collimators are included in this class even if
their main role is to prevent damage. The final class
contains the instrumentation which will be used to
provide general diagnosis of incidents. Beam Loss
monitors will also fulfill this role but, more critically,
they belong to the protection class.
The table indicates systems which must capture fast
transients. Information on self-triggering and response to
the Post Mortem Trigger is included. The penultimate
column shows that many systems must be operational for
the Sector Test.
Several open points require further discussions with
system experts, for example, concerning triggering for
protection systems. The following summaries are a first
attempt to describe data requirements at a system level
and need further elaboration with specialists and users.
3.1 Data from Services
Data from the following services is necessary to
understand indirect causes of incidents. All systems are
expected to generate alarms destined for the system
specialist and the end user. They are therefore not
mentioned systematically although they are expected to
be a valuable source of Post Mortem information.
3.1.1 Access System
This system must be able to create Beam and Power
Aborts to ensure personnel safety. The status of all access
chains must be logged.
3.1.2 Cooling and Ventilation
Air temperatures in all equipment areas and cooling
circuit flow rates and temperatures should be collected.
An industrial supervisor is being supplied with these
systems and it is anticipated that extensive logging will be
available.
3.1.3 Cryogenics
Again, an industrial supervisor is being supplied and
this will provide extensive logging with a depth of some
hours. Experts anticipate that information concerning
incidents will be stored for longer.
3.1.4 Electrical Network
It must be expected that perturbations in the form of
spikes and voltage drops will continue to disturb
operation with potentially serious knock-on effects.
Recordings of these events will be necessary in order to
understand their origins. Accelerator level analysis will
be through alarm information.
3.1.5 Safety Systems
Fire detectors, gas detectors, emergency stops and red
telephones should supply information through the CERN
Alarm System.
3.2 Data from Protection Systems
These systems must always be self-triggering and may
also be required to respond to the Post Mortem Trigger.
Equipment level Post Mortem is a primary concern but is
outside the current context.
3.2.1 Beam Dumping System
This includes kicker systems, magnets and power
converters for beam transport and the absorber block.
Transient recordings of the circulating beam, extracted
beam, the extraction kick and profiles are essential to
demonstrate correct beam dumping.
3.2.2 Beam Loss Monitors
They are included here as it seems likely that they will
become a critical part of the Machine Protection System
providing information to trigger a Beam Abort. Their
performance in this role must be systematically recorded.
These elements will also provide general diagnostic
data; information should be recorded at 100 Hz with a
depth of 20 seconds to monitor events leading up to the
Post Mortem Trigger.
3.2.3 Energy Extraction Switches
The status of these switches must be logged and, in
addition, transient recording of their temperatures and the
voltages across the parallel resistors provided. Loss of
redundancy of these systems will generate alarms.
3.2.4 Machine Protection System
A comprehensive logging of all status information will
be of key interest to the Control Room.
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3.2.5 Quench Protection System
Transient recordings of active voltage taps and heater
discharge voltages will be required. Loss of redundancy
in the heater power supplies will generate alarms.
3.3 Systems that act on the Beam
These systems will be the primary suspects in the case
of a Beam Abort or important beam loss.
3.3.1 Aperture Kickers
These are designed to kick the beam to the machine
aperture. Kicks must be properly synchronized and at the
correct voltage. Discharges must be recorded.
3.3.2 Global Feedback Systems
These will be used to autonomously control critical
beam parameters such as orbit, tune and chromaticity. All
sensors and actuators must be equipped with recorders. A
combination of sampling speeds are needed, fixed rates to
track long term effects and more rapid recording when
the errors are large.
3.3.3 Collimators
These are slow devices. All movements must be
recorded with adequate resolution; this might be achieved
by logging techniques.
3.3.4 Inflector
This must be equipped with recording equipment to
demonstrate the correct synchronization and voltage of all
discharges.
3.3.5 Power Converters
Transient recording of the currents is required. The
sampling speed for circuits with long decay times will
probably have to be reduced after a Post Mortem Trigger
to cover long decays; the information is needed to check
that electrical breakdown does not occur in the gaseous
helium. All status and interlock information should be
logged.
3.3.6 RF Systems
The correct operation of the RF can be demonstrated
by the absence of beam in the abort gap and the evolution
of the mean radial position. The group is considering
acquisition of many fast signals for tuning and diagnostic
purposes. Hardware interlocks will be logged and time
stamped building on the experience gained at LEP.
3.3.7 Reference Magnets
This system will provide control signals for feedback
to power converters (see Global Feedback Systems
Section). Information to be recorded will include
predicted and measured multipoles. A direct recording of
the measurement coil signal and a comparison with an
independent measurement, a hot spare, should be
considered. Logging will track drifts over time, the
frequency would depend on the machine state: faster on
the ramp.
3.3.8 Transverse Dampers
A recording of the damping of each injection should be
available. Additionally, wideband transverse signals
should be available to check for instability growth. As
with the RF system a large amount of data will be
required to diagnose faults at the equipment level.
3.3.9 Vacuum System for the Beam
The status of all valves and pumps should be logged.
Slow logging of pressures will be sufficient in the LHC.
3.4 Beam Monitors
The stored energy in the beam will be the source of
most incidents during LHC operation. Comprehensive
diagnostics of beam parameters will be essential. The
following list of instruments is preliminary.
3.4.1 Beam Current Monitors
Transient recording of both the DC and 40 MHz BCT
systems will be required. The slow system will follow
currents over periods of many seconds. The fast BCT will
follow the evolution of intensity within a turn, for a
period of typically 1000 turns.
3.4.2 Beam Position Monitors
These will be essential for the diagnosis of beam
induced quenches. It is currently being considered to
store 1000 turns for each pick-up and 1000 closed orbits.
The latter are integrated over about 20 ms, thus providing
about 20 seconds of history.
3.4.3 Beam Profile Monitors
Knowledge of the beams’ profiles before and after a
Post Mortem Trigger will provide information concerning
machine acceptance and transverse behaviour. More
slowly varying information should be logged for
comparison.
3.4.4 Cryostat Instrumentation
Operational conditions inside the accelerator cryostats
will be of interest to the Control Room; this information
includes temperatures, pressures and heater status. It
appears that quench events can be recorded with adequate
granularity by periodic logging from the cryogenic
control system which has a bandwidth approaching 1 Hz.
As a final remark on data needs, it should be accepted
that the complexity of the machine will certainly lead to
oversights. Thus, a standard hardware solution for rapid
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connection of currently interesting information will be
very useful.
4 DATA ANALYSIS
A two-level approach is recommended for the analysis
of Post Mortem data. At the LHC, the Control Room
software will be required to support models of machine
systems which provide insight into the underlying
processes that need to be adjusted for optimum
accelerator performance. This specific software will also
be used for first level diagnosis of Post Mortem
information. Well-known applications that are required
here include the closed orbit analysis and correction
package and the ‘thousand turn’ package which provides
diagnostics of the accelerator optics. Many other
examples exist and the applications must be designed to
support Post Mortem as well as beam tuning and other
requirements.
Another important example of specific software is the
Machine Protection System which must provide a
summary overview and the possibility to drill down to
more detailed status information. A view of how this
might appear is shown in Figure 1. This is expected to be
permanently displayed to the machine operators and
frozen when a Post Mortem Trigger occurs. These
specific applications must be fully integrated into the Post
Mortem Facilities. In particular they must be able to
interface to Post Mortem data management and archiving.
The second level approach to data analysis will be the
use of generic tools to compare information across many
sub-systems. If a satisfactory analysis of an incident
cannot be provided by the first level, then this more
laborious approach will be necessary. Two well-known
tools for this type of analysis are the correlation plot and
the event sequence. A correlation plot allows information
from all systems to be represented on the same graph.
Taking into account the large number of input channels
such an analysis can only be used to confirm or illustrate
an observation. The event sequence is a chronological
ordering of event information which could be used to
search for the original cause of an incident. This is very
similar to the alarm displays used by the Control Room
now. A future Post Mortem event sequence should
integrate data from logging and alarm sources. The
refinement of such tools and the elaboration of algorithms
to search Post Mortem data will certainly accompany the
initial period of operation. More urgent issues to be
addressed are the collection and management of the

























information using common triggers, time standards, data
interfaces and perhaps standard hardware.
5 TRIGGERS AND TIME STAMPING
Beam Aborts and Power Aborts are expected to
provoke the large majority of Post Mortem Triggers. As
knowledge of the LHC grows, then less serious incidents
will become the major obstacles to machine efficiency.
Partial beam losses must be detected and used to create a
Post Mortem Trigger. Finally, a flexible means to
generate conditioned triggers will be necessary for
understanding other phenomena and for machine
development. The Post Mortem Trigger will freeze
transient recorders and invoke a snapshot of logging and
alarm systems for longer term storage. It will also initiate
the transfer of data to the Control Room.
Because of these less critical applications of the Post
Mortem Facilities the need arises for a dual Post Mortem
capacity for protection systems. Under no circumstances
should one of these systems be unable to record its own
operation because its recording system has been fired by
a Post Mortem Trigger. Furthermore, a self-trigger may
be a useful data reduction tool; it seems unnecessary to
collect quench protection information from thousands of
channels where no quench has occurred.
In order to correlate information all data must be time
stamped with a common clock. The Timing Working
Group has recommended1 that UTC should become the
standard for time keeping at the LHC. Effort is needed to
define how systems will acquire this information but it is
important that the time stamping is performed at the
source and not added when data is passed up towards the
Control Room.
Many processes are ‘slow’ and do not need high
resolution time stamps. Time in some PLCs is accurate to
about 10 ms and the proposed distribution of time using
GPS receivers and IRIG B is accurate to about 1 µs.
These values are suitable for time stamping cryogenic and
beam processes respectively. Time could also be
calibrated by requiring all systems to receive and time
stamp a Post Mortem Trigger event transmitted by the
machine slow timing system. However the precision of
this system has not yet been defined
6 DATA REPRESENTATION
Having ensured a common clock it is still necessary to
define how Post Mortem data will be represented.
Experience from running Strings at CERN and from
HERA operation reveals that:
                                                          
1
 Minutes of SLTC (http://lhc.web.cern.ch/lhc/sltc/sltc.htm),
Dec 6, 2000.
x data sets must be self-describing,
x a data set should only contain information from one
sensor,
x a sensor may only have one time base but several
amplitude channels, and
x data should be in ASCII!
These recommendations are illustrated in Figure 2 which
includes some of the data interfaces used at the Strings.
Time base information can describe a constant interval
or different sampling rates which are used to obtain better
resolution for faster parts of a process, but slower
sampling in order to capture a long decay. Many different
calibration techniques have been used for dependent
variables including polynomials and look-up tables.
Information about physical units is included. Error bars
have not been foreseen and, if required, should not
prevent the data from being pasted into common desktop
tools.
7 DATA MANAGEMENT
Figure 3 presents an overview of the LHC Post Mortem
Facility. It illustrates the various sources of data that will
be used to build a complete explanation of an incident at
the LHC. Additional sources to those discussed so far will
certainly include the machine’s nominal settings,
indicated as Operator Transaction.
For these sources to provide coherent information, the
design and management of these systems must be
coordinated. Aspects to be considered include the
organization of information from the different sources
and the management of long term archives. As the
volume of accumulated information is certain to expand
to fill the available techniques, neglect in this area will
compromise the long term improvement of LHC
performance.













































Post Mortem will be an essential tool at the LHC from
the initial hardware commissioning through to attainment
of the design goals and beyond. Facilities must be
complete and coherent across all systems and will rely on
careful consideration not only of the information that is to
be collected but also on the rigid application of common
time stamping and data representation techniques. The
system has overlapping functionality with the alarm and
logging techniques as used at SPS and LEP, and the
design of the systems must be coordinated.
Work is required to refine the signal definition which is
outlined here and to clarify the recording frequencies and
depths. Hardware interfaces must also be defined;
common hardware should be considered that has the
capacity for addition of signals, perhaps on a temporary
basis.
The problem of managing the Post Mortem archives
must be addressed to provide rapid access to data and to
build the long term reference needed to improve machine
performance.
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Figure 3, Post Mortem Facility Overview
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